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The Search for a Stable 
Money Demand Equation 
James N. Duprey, Senior Economist 
Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
The ability to predict fairly accurately how much of 
its wealth the public will want to hold as money is 
important for monetary policymaking as it is currently 
practiced. The Federal Reserve must set target levels 
for the money supply which will help the nation reach 
its goals for unemployment, inflation, and economic 
growth. To set the targets, one of the many tools the 
Fed uses is an equation which describes the historical 
relationships of things like spending and interest rates 
to the money balances that people hold. Assuming 
various growth rates of money and using this equation 
in conjunction with others, the Fed can predict the 
corresponding levels of the related variables to help 
it choose the rate most appropriate for the nation's 
goals. 
For quite some time, however, this equation has not 
been reliable. It never was a perfect predictor of money 
demand, but in the mid-1970s it overshot actual levels 
by surprisingly large amounts, and since then its errors 
have only gotten larger. The equation has become 
statistically unstable. That is, the historical relation-
ships between money demand and its determinants— 
as estimated in the coefficients of the equation—have 
been changing in unpredictable ways over time. In 
order to project historical relationships between vari-
ables and come close to what the actual levels for those 
variables will be, the relationships obviously must re-
main fairly stable. 
Much effort has been expended to search for a stable 
money demand equation. Researchers have tried using 
different variables in the equation, variables which 
they thought might be more closely related to money 
demand. Recently the Fed and others have tried using 
different definitions of money, recognizing the rapid 
growth in financial assets other than the traditional 
bank checking accounts and cash. So far, however, 
none of these efforts has significantly improved the 
forecasting ability of the money demand equation. 
Considering the economic theory underlying this 
equation, we aren't surprised by that failure. The equa-
tion does not take account of how people really decide 
how much money they want to hold, especially when 
their options are changing as rapidly as lately. The 
underlying theory suggests that the equation won't be 
able to accurately predict the public's demand for 
money until the financial industry settles down, and 
that's not likely to be soon. 
More important for the Fed, recent theoretical analy-
sis suggests that even then the equation will be useless 
as a policy tool. Thus, model builders concerned with 
evaluating the effects of alternative economic policies 
should not be tinkering with the standard macroeco-
nomic equation, but rather changing their whole ap-
proach to modeling economic behavior. 
A Demonstration of the Equation's Failure 
The magnitude of the recent prediction errors of the 
money demand equation can be demonstrated by the 
performance of a representative equation. We esti-
mated the relationships between money holdings and 
some fairly standard determinants for the period starting 
in the fourth quarter of 1960 and ending in the second 
quarter of 1974 (see the accompanying table). Then 
the equation was used to project what money demand 
would be in the next 22 quarters. The accompanying 
chart shows the results for what used to be the Fed's 
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A Representative Money Demand Equation 
for Real M-1* 
Sample Period: 1960:4-1974:2 
Determinant  Coefficient ^-statistic 
Constant .2520 
Real GNP .1556 
3-month Treasury bill rate -.0107 
Commercial bank passbook rate -.0362 










Standard error of estimate 
Sum of squared residuals 
Durbin /7-statistic 









*AII variables are in log form. Real variables are nominal values deflated by the 
implicit GNP deflator. The lagged dependent variable is the lagged nominal 
stock of money divided by the current value of the G N P deflator. 
Coefficient estimates were obtained by applying the Cochrane-Orcutt pro-
cedure of iterative least squares. 
most basic measure of money: M-1, those things peo-
ple were thought to use most often to make payments— 
currency and checking accounts at commercial banks. 
The equation overpredicted demand by increas-
ingly larger amounts over the nearly six-year period. It 
started out with an error of $2 billion in the third 
quarter of 1974, which more than doubled to $5 billion 
in the next quarter. The error expanded to $20 billion 
one year later and by mid-1977 measured $36 billion. 
In the remaining quarters, the error broadened further, 
first only slightly but then quite a bit, until in late 1979 
it reached $62 billion. 
As dramatic as that looks, only statistical tests can 
tell whether or not this equation is stable, for even 
stable equations make bigger errors the further out they 
forecast. We estimated new coefficients for the equa-
tion over the forecast period (mid-1974 through 1979) 
and compared them statistically to the coefficients for 
the earlier period. The hypothesis that the coefficients 
were the same in both periods was rejected at the 5 per-
cent level of significance. According to the test, that is, 
Forecasted and Actual Levels of M-1 







1974  1976 
Sources: Forecast—Dynamic simulation of the standard equation 
described in the accompanying table 
Actual—Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
this equation is not stable.
1 
The Economic Theory Behind the Equation 
Just what is wrong with the equation has been the sub-
ject of much study since the mid-1970s. Researchers 
have taken two basic approaches to the problem, both 
of which are based on a common economic theory. 
To be able to write equations to predict what the 
total demand for money will be in the whole economy, 
one must first be able to explain what determines a 
person's or firm's demand for money. Economists 
usually do this by assuming that, in this as in every 
other economic situation, individuals want to do the 
best they can for themselves. 
•An equation for M-2, the Fed's slightly broader measure of money, 
performed just about as badly. Meant to represent the media of exchange plus 
the assets most easily converted into those media, M-2 includes M-1 plus time 
and savings deposits at commercial banks (excluding large certificates of 
deposit). The failure of this equation indicates that the M-1 equation was not 
failing simply because people were shifting more money than usual from cash 
and checking accounts into time and savings accounts at banks. 
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Individuals start a particular time period with some 
wealth, and during the period they add to that wealth 
by earning income. They also spend during the period, 
paying current prices to acquire goods and services. 
Some of the spending is planned—regular bill pay-
ments that can be fairly well known in advance. Some 
is unexpected—buying on impulse or for emergencies, 
for example. To handle this spending, individuals must 
hold money (the current means of payment) which 
traditionally does not pay interest, but money is only 
one of a variety of ways they can hold their wealth. 
Stocks, bonds, and savings accounts, for example, do 
pay dividends or interest, which makes them more 
attractive than the means of payment. Converting these 
other assets into the means of payment costs something, 
though: the time, trouble, and money it takes to get to 
the bank or broker and make the exchange. 
What individuals will want to do, economists theorize, 
is allocate their wealth among money and other assets 
so that they maximize the return they can get from 
nonmoney assets over and above the costs of convert-
ing what they must into money. 
The total demand for money in the economy in any 
period, then, will be the sum of all individuals' demand 
for money and can be represented in an equation by 
aggregate measures of the factors determining the de-
mand of individuals: 
• how much wealth or income they have 
• how much they must spend 
• how uncertain they are about spending 
• how much interest can be made on other assets 
(the opportunity cost of holding money) 
• how much converting other assets to money costs 
(the transaction costs). 
The Standard Equation 
The equation which most economists have used to 
predict the demand for money has not included explicit 
aggregate measures of all these factors. Both income 
and spending are typically represented by one measure, 
since all spending becomes somebody's income. That 
measure is gross national product (GNP), which in the 
equation is separated into its two components, real 
GNP, a measure of the physical goods and services 
produced, and the GNP deflator, a measure of their 
current prices. The opportunity cost of holding money 
is usually represented by one or two short-term interest 
rates, often the rate on commercial bank passbook 
savings accounts and the rate on three-month Treasury 
bills. However, the standard equation does not include 
measures of either the uncertainty about spending or 
transaction costs because there simply are no good 
ones. How, for example, do you measure the costs of 
things like a trip to the bank to withdraw money or to a 
broker to cash in securities? 
Economists have included in the standard equation 
a factor not otherwise prescribed by the one-period 
theory above: the level of the money stock in the 
previous period. Economists have assumed that, when 
conditions change, people cannot immediately adjust 
their money holdings to the levels they would like. In 
any period, therefore, the amount of money held is 
assumed to be only part way between the desired 
amount implied by the theory and the actual amount 
held in the last period. Including last period's money 
stock in the standard equation can thus help predict 
what this period's will be. 
One Approach: Replace the Determinants 
One obvious way to try to correct an aggregate demand 
equation has been to replace and add to the usual 
aggregate measures of the determinants. Researchers 
have suspected that the standard equation may be 
failing because it's using poor representatives of those 
things theory says determine money demand or because 
it's simply omitting some. They have suggested some 
alternative and additional measures which they have 
then tested in the money demand equation. The hope 
has been that, through trial and error, variables which 
produce a stable equation will be found. 
Suggested Alternative Variables 
Some economists have argued that GNP isn't a very 
good proxy for income and spending. It measures total 
spending on final goods and services (those being 
bought by the ultimate user) in a given time period. In 
doing so, it excludes purchases of goods for resale or 
further processing, trade in used goods and existing 
real assets, and financial exchanges of things like 
stocks and bonds. Besides that, GNP includes some 
imputed values which are not measures of actual spend-
ing—estimates of the rental value of owner-occupied 
homes and the market value of food produced and con-
sumed on farms. As an alternative for GNP in the 
demand equation, therefore, some researchers have 
suggested trying debits to demand deposits (the amount 
of checks written on bank checking accounts) since this 
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measure does not have GNP's exclusions or imputed 
values. Others have suggested household net worth, a 
measure of wealth, both as a replacement for GNP and 
as an added variable to distinguish between wealth and 
income effects. 
Some researchers have suggested that individuals do 
not base their money holding decisions on the current 
level of prices, which the standard equation includes, 
but rather on "perceived" prices—the level people 
consider "normal." Researchers suggest that the stan-
dard equation would thus be improved by including a 
measure of how people form their perceptions of what 
is normal: some average of current and past price 
levels. 
Several alternatives have been suggested for the 
standard measures of the opportunity cost of holding 
money. In hopes of finding a closer relationship to 
money demand, researchers have proposed trying sub-
stitutes for the three-month Treasury bill rate: the rate 
on short-term commercial paper, that on long-term 
U.S. government securities or corporate bonds, and the 
dividend-price ratio, which is meant to represent the 
yield on all physical capital. Other researchers think 
that a better alternative than rates on individual assets 
might be a measure of the entire term structure of in-
terest rates, that is, the relationship between all assets' 
lengths of maturity and their yields. Still others have 
suggested adding inflation to the equation, as a repre-
sentation of the rate of return that holding goods 
instead of money offers. 
As we said, the uncertainty about spending is not 
included in the standard equation because it is not easy 
to measure. If this factor has remained constant, omit-
ting it has not affected the equation's ability to 
predict the demand for money. Some researchers have 
suggested, however, that uncertainty was reduced sig-
nificantly starting in 1973-74 when high interest rates 
induced many businesses to improve their cash man-
agement procedures.
2 By setting up a more extensive 
communications network or writing new computer 
programs then, they were able to know much more 
confidently what their needs for cash were in any 
subsequent period and so were able to hold smaller 
reserve balances. In effect, their demand for money 
was reduced. 
Researchers trying to capture these effects in the 
money demand equation have considered the decision 
to adopt new cash management techniques as an invest-
ment problem which involves more than the one 
time period that the theory specifies. For the individual 
firm, adopting these procedures is an investment which 
has an immediate fixed cost but which will pay off over 
many periods in the future by allowing more of the 
firm's wealth to be held in interest-bearing assets. 
Businesses look ahead, therefore, and make this invest-
ment only when they expect interest rates to rise high 
enough to pay for the fixed cost of the investment. The 
demand for money will thus be reduced by the new 
procedures only when interest rates are unusually high 
and rising. 
A way to get this into an aggregate equation, re-
searchers say, is to first assume that all those who find 
it profitable to invest in the new techniques at current 
interest rates do so and that others do not find it 
profitable until rates have risen higher than they have 
been in the past. Then to the equation can be added a 
ratchet variable which measures the amount by which 
some representative interest rate currently exceeds its 
last peak. The variable would rise with market rates, 
reaching a peak itself whenever rates reached a new 
peak, and as it did, have a depressing effect on the 
demand for money. 
Testing the Alternatives 
One of the first empirical studies to test some of these 
suggested remedial measures was done by Enzler, 
Johnson, and Paulus (1976). Using as the sample 
period the second quarter of 1955 through the second 
quarter of 1974 (1955:2 through 1974:2), they reesti-
mated the coefficients of the standard M-l demand 
equation with replacements and additions to the set of 
determinants. Some of the variants they tried include 
replacing GNP with a debits-derived spending variable, 
adding household net worth and the change in net 
worth, replacing the bill rate with the rate on commer-
cial paper, adding ratchet variables, and then com-
bining some of these possibilities. After reestimation, 
the new equations were used to predict demand in the 
period 1974:3 through 1976:1. While several of the 
equations weren't as far off as the standard equation, 
none was able to lower the cumulative overprediction 
error by as much as one-half. Enzler, Johnson, and 
2Some researchers have interpreted the effects of improved cash manage-
ment procedures as reduced transaction costs rather than reduced uncertainty, 
but that difference is not crucial here. 
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Paulus admitted that they had not produced a satis-
factory empirical demand function. 
Goldfeld (1976) failed too. In an intensive study the 
alternatives and additions he tried include debits to 
demand deposits and household net worth for the 
spending or income variable; "perceived" prices instead 
of actual prices; the short-term commercial paper rate, 
the long-term corporate bond rate, and inflation for the 
opportunity cost variable; and ratchet variables. Besides 
these new variables, Goldfeld also tried using more 
sophisticated estimation techniques. Despite all that, 
he did not produce a stable demand equation. In an 
attempt to pinpoint the problem, he estimated separate 
demand equations for households, financial and nonfi-
nancial business firms, state and local governments, 
and the rest of the world. On predicting 1974 and 1975, 
he found that these equations (especially the one for 
nonfinancial business firms) made substantial errors, 
substantial enough to conclude that a disaggregated 
approach to projecting total money demand was not 
any better than the aggregate approach. 
One study appeared at first to have improved the 
standard equation. Hamburger (1977) estimated an 
M-1 equation for the sample period 1955:2 through 
1972:4 in which he simply replaced the Treasury bill 
rate with the long-term U.S. government bond rate and 
the dividend-price ratio as more appropriate measures 
of opportunity cost. When put to work over the period 
1973:1 through 1976:2, this equation overpredicted 
money demand in every quarter but one. The errors, 
however, were relatively small, much smaller than 
those in our table above. While Hamburger did not 
claim that his equation was stable, he did think that its 
determinants were more closely related to money 
demand than those usually used and that it was a better 
predictor than the standard equation. 
Others have criticized Hamburger's equation, though. 
Porter and Mauskopf (1978) argued that the appropri-
ate return on capital in a money demand equation is 
not the dividend-price ratio Hamburger used, but rather 
a nominal return that takes into account expected gains 
and losses. And this is not a minor misspecification, 
according to Porter and Mauskopf s test. When they 
set the dividend-price ratio at a fixed value to neu-
tralize its effect, they found that an estimated version 
of Hamburger's equation overpredicted demand from 
1974:3 to 1977:4 by as much as a standard equation. 
Though inappropriate theoretically, the dividend-price 
ratio was largely responsible for improving the empiri-
cal performance of the standard equation. Hafer and 
Hein (1979) found something wrong with Hamburger's 
equation too. They noted that in it the long-run elas-
ticity of income (or the ratio of changes in money 
demand to changes in income) is constrained to one, 
even though other evidence suggests it is considerably 
smaller. When they relaxed this constraint, they found 
that over the period 1973:1 to 1977:1 the cumulative 
prediction errors more than doubled. 
Most recently, researchers have examined the con-
tention that the term structure of interest rates, rather 
than any individual rates, is the right measure of op-
portunity cost. Heller and Khan (1979) devised a 
set of three variables to concisely represent the term 
structure quarter by quarter and included them in a 
standard M-1 demand equation which they estimated 
for the period 1960:3 through 1976:4. They then 
statistically tested this equation over that same period 
and found it reasonably stable. They did not, however, 
check its forecasting performance for any later period, 
that is, for any period it was not explicitly designed to 
predict well. Porter and Mauskopf (1978) did. They 
estimated the same equation using data for the period 
1960:3 through 1974:2 and then had it predict the next 
three and a half years. For this period, the equation's 
overprediction errors were very large, generally match-
ing those of a more conventional equation. However 
desirable it may be theoretically to include term struc-
ture variables in the money demand equation, there-
fore, including them does not produce a reliable, stable 
equation.
3 
Another Approach: Redefine Money 
The determinant approach to improving the money 
3The contradictory results of these two studies appear to be due to the low 
power of the statistical tests Heller and Khan used to detect changes in the 
coefficients of their money demand equation. They first tested whether or not 
the coefficients followed a linear trend during the sample period instead of 
remaining constant and found that they did not, but this may or may not reveal 
anything about the possibility of a change in coefficients at the end of their 
period, namely, 1975-76. Their other two tests, labeled the cumsums and 
cumsums-squared tests, involved examinations of the one-period-ahead fore-
casting errors of the money demand equation. Garbade (1977), through a 
series of Monte Carlo experiments, has examined the power of both these 
procedures to detect a change in the slope coefficient of a two-variable model 
when the coefficient follows a random walk or makes a discrete jump in the 
middle of the data period or follows a stable Markov process. He found that the 
cumsums test was virtually powerless in all cases. The power of the cumsums-
squared test varied from zero to 100 percent, depending on the pattern and 
degree of coefficient change. In the case of a discrete jump of 50 percent or 
less, its power was considerably less than 50 percent. 
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demand equation, then, has not been at all successful. 
Researchers have not been able to find better measures 
of the determinants of money demand. Of course, they 
have not yet tried everything, and one particular omis-
sion may be crucial. Economic theory considers trans-
action costs, or the costs of converting financial assets 
into something which can be exchanged for goods and 
services, as an important determinant of money demand, 
but these costs have been impossible to measure ade-
quately. If for some assets they have fallen extremely 
low — approaching or reaching zero — these assets 
may actually have become new means of payment. 
This suggests the other basic approach to correcting 
the demand equation: redefine money. The idea is that 
if the aggregate measures of money can be broadened 
to include the new as well as the old means of payment, 
then a standard equation reestimated with the new 
definitions should be able to more accurately predict 
money demand without explicitly measuring trans-
action costs. The effects of the changed transaction 
costs would simply be cancelled out as the demand for 
the old money fell and the demand for the new money 
rose. 
There's no doubt that since the mid-1970s the 
financial system has virtually exploded with new and 
more attractive ways to hold wealth and make pay-
ments. Whereas commercial banks used to be the only 
institutions which could offer checking accounts, for 
example, today accounts which can have claims written 
against them are also available from mutual savings 
banks and savings and loan associations (NOW ac-
counts), credit unions (share drafts), and money market 
mutual funds (MMMF shares)—and most of these pay 
interest. Banks themselves now offer to automatically 
transfer money from saving accounts into checking 
accounts so that all the depositor's money bears inter-
est until needed to make a payment (ATS accounts). 
Banks and savings and loans offer accounts which let 
depositors order a transfer of funds between savings 
and checking accounts by a simple telephone call. And 
these firms have potentially almost eliminated the need 
for checklike instruments by offering savings accounts 
from which prearranged bill payments can be made 
electronically. 
These innovations seem to have made it nearly 
costless to convert some interest-bearing assets into 
means of payment. The new instruments being used to 
make payments have thus in effect become money, and 
the demand for them has increased at the expense of 
the demand for the traditional measures. To capture 
the effects of these drastically changed transaction 
costs in money demand equations and so improve the 
equations' predictions, economists needed a more up-
to-date definition of money. 
The Fed's Proposals 
So did the Federal Reserve. Early in 1979, the staff of 
the Fed's Board of Governors published for comment 
a set of proposed redefinitions of the monetary aggre-
gates (see Simpson 1979).
4 The Fed proposed that 
besides the traditional currency and demand deposits 
held by the public at commercial banks, its medium of 
exchange measure, M-l, also include NOW balances 
at all depository institutions, share draft accounts at 
credit unions, demand deposits at thrifts, and ATS 
accounts at banks. (It also proposed that M-l exclude 
demand deposits held by foreign banks and official 
institutions, since they appeared to be unrelated to 
economic activity in the United States.) 
Other interest-bearing assets affected by recent in-
novations, the Fed suggested, were still not quite 
means of payment, but were now easily converted into 
them and so belonged in its somewhat broader measure 
of money, M-2. That measure had included old M-l 
plus time and savings deposits at commercial banks. 
The Fed proposed changing this to include proposed 
M-l plus just savings deposits, but at all financial 
firms, not just banks. 
However, neither of these proposed definitions seemed 
to improve the stability of the money demand equation.
5 
The Fed staff itself (see Simpson 1979) reestimated 
the relationships of variables in the standard equation 
with the proposed definitions and had the equations 
predict demand in the period 1974:3 through 1978:2— 
without much better results than with the old definition. 
Another Fed study, by Porter, Mauskopf, Lindsey, 
and Berner (1979), got the same sort of results. They 
conducted an extended statistical investigation of money 
demand equations with both the old and proposed 
definitions, including estimating equations and pro-
4Improving the performance of the money demand equation was not the 
only reason for the Fed's redefinitions of money. Because of the recent finan-
cial market innovations, the Fed also simply wanted "to bring the monetary 
aggregates up to date" as economic indicators (see Simpson 1979, p. 14). 
5 Statistical work with the proposed definitions was complicated by the lack 
of reliable data series on some of the new assets included in them. 
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jecting demand over different historical periods and 
formally testing for stability. They concluded that 
"shifts over time" had characterized demand equations 
for all money definitions (p. 42). 
Because of data problems, the Fed left out of its 
proposed definitions two financial assets which many 
thought would improve them as measures of the things 
people are using as money: shares in money market 
mutual funds (MMMFs) and repurchase agreements 
(RPs). MMMFs invest in short-term money market 
instruments, like Treasury bills, and generally let share-
holders redeem shares by letter, by telephone, or by 
check drawn on the funds. Shares in MMMFs are 
therefore more attractive than conventional demand 
deposits for some people. A security RP is usually a 
very short-term loan made by a large depositor to a 
financial firm. The firm actually sells a security in its 
portfolio to the depositor and simultaneously agrees to 
repurchase it at a specified time and price. RPs' short 
maturities (frequently only one business day) make 
them a convenient interest-earning alternative to cash. 
Two studies of money demand attempted to show 
that including one or both of these instruments in the 
medium of exchange definition of money permits stan-
dard empirical demand equations to perform more 
satisfactorily. 
Garcia and Pak (1979) did not clearly succeed. 
They developed two statistical series which they admit 
are imperfect estimates of overnight RPs. They added 
these to the old definition of M-1 to get two revised 
money stock measures. When they estimated standard 
demand equations with these measures and had the 
equations predict 1973-76, they found that in 1974-76 
one was not as far off as a standard equation employed 
to explain old M-1. While Garcia and Pak counted this 
as a success, they did not present evidence nor claim 
that they had located stable functions. In fact, they 
pointed out that their equations did not forecast well in 
1973-74. 
Wenninger and Sivesind (1979) took a somewhat 
similar approach, and at first glance they appear to 
have been more successful. They defined money gen-
erally as all checkable assets plus overnight RPs. For a 
working definition, they started with the Fed's pro-
posed M-1 and added shares in MMMFs, all nonbank 
RPs at 46 money center banks, and all RPs between 
government security dealers and nonfinancial corpora-
tions. They also added savings deposits held by busi-
ness firms and state and local governments in order to 
capture the shift from checking to savings accounts that 
occurred when savings accounts for these economic 
units were authorized in 1974-75. With this definition 
they estimated a demand equation of the standard form 
and then had the equation predict money demand in 
the period 1974:3 through 1978:4. In 1974-75, their 
equation overpredicted demand pretty much as usual. 
Over the whole period, however, its performance was 
considerably better than usual. Their equation also 
passed a formal stability test. 
The validity of these results is questionable, though, 
when they are compared with another recent study's. 
Porter, Simpson, and Mauskopf (1979) also included 
MMMF shares and RPs in their definition of money, 
but unlike Wenninger and Sivesind, they did not 
produce a stable equation. For the period 1974:3 
through 1979:1, their standard equation badly over-
predicted money demand. Its cumulative errors mounted 
very rapidly in 1974-75, matching those of a typical 
demand equation. In 1976-78 the errors did not grow 
further, but in 1979:1, the last predicted quarter, they 
did. 
Why the two equations performed so differently 
might be traced to their slightly different money defini-
tions. Wenninger and Sivesind used proposed M-1, 
whereas Porter, Simpson, and Mauskopf used old M-1 
—yet that shouldn't make a difference here: equations 
with both M-ls have failed tests of stability. The only 
other difference between the two is Wenninger and 
Sivesind's addition of business and government savings 
deposits as a "shift" component, which the other study 
omitted. The addition of this component was arbitrary 
in the sense that the theory does not prescribe it. Since 
an arbitrary component seems to be what made Wennin-
ger and Sivesind's equation stable, their results are 
suspect and raise the questions of whether and when 
and what further special adjustments would have to be 
made to make the equation keep predicting accurately. 
The Fed's New Definitions 
The Federal Reserve reviewed the comments it received 
on the proposed definitions, solved some of its data 
problems, and in February 1980 announced the offi-
cial new definitions of money (see Simpson 1980). The 
Fed decided not to include MMMF shares or RPs in 
its definition of the medium of exchange. It split M-1 
into two measures so that the growth of NOW accounts 
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could more easily be tracked. The narrowest measure 
now is M-l A, which equals old M-l less demand 
deposits held by foreign commercial banks and official 
institutions. M-1B equals M-l A plus checkable de-
posits at all financial firms, which makes it the same as 
the proposed M-l. 
The Fed did decide to include the two controversial 
assets in its broader definition of money, though. The 
new M-2, which still attempts to measure the medium 
of exchange and all its close substitutes, consists of 
M-1B plus shares in MMMFs, overnight RPs issued 
by commercial banks, and overnight Eurodollar lia-
bilities issued by Caribbean branches of member banks 
to U.S. nonbank residents, as well as savings and small 
time deposits at all depository institutions. 
Bennett et al. (1980) tested these new definitions to 
see if any of them make the equation a better predictor 
of money demand. 
Not surprisingly, the new M-l definitions don't. 
These researchers estimated the coefficients of stan-
dard demand equations for M-l A and M-1B using 
data for 1960:4 through 1974:2 and had the equations 
predict demand in 1974:3 through 1979:4. For M-1A 
the cumulative overprediction error totaled $62.3 bil-
lion, equal to 16.9 percent of the actual level. The 
M-1B equation did only slightly better; its cumulative 
error reached $46.9 billion, equal to 12.2 percent of 
the actual level. Both demand equations failed formal 
tests of stability. 
Bennett et al. also evaluated the new M-2 definition, 
but using a standard equation in a slightly different 
form. In it money demand as a proportion of nominal 
household net worth is a function of the ratio of GNP 
to net worth, three short-term interest rates, and the 
lagged value of the money-wealth ratio. They esti-
mated this equation on the same initial data period and 
had it predict the same period as the M-l equations. 
The results were mixed. In the first part of the period it 
overpredicted; then in the last part it underpredicted. 
By the final quarter the underprediction totaled $29.4 
billion, equal to 1.9 percent of the actual value. 
This is a relatively good performance, but not an 
undisputable one. It appears to have occurred because 
the coefficient on the lagged money-wealth ratio is 
0.996, while other coefficients are either small (on the 
bill and passbook rates) or small and insignificant (on 
the ratio of GNP to net worth and the time deposit 
rate). The size of the coefficient on the lagged variable 
implies unrealistically that people react to a discrep-
ancy between their desired and actual asset holdings 
at a microscopic pace. Considering the smallness of 
the other coefficients, it also implies that the lagged 
values dominate the demand equation. In short, this is 
at best an unorthodox money demand equation. And 
more damaging, it failed formal tests for structural 
stability. 
Why the Search is Failing 
So, neither redefining money nor revising the deter-
minants of money demand has improved the ability of 
the standard macroeconomic equation to predict the 
public's demand for money. What more can be done? 
Not much, according to economic theory. Theory 
suggests that the equation has been failing and will 
likely continue to fail for quite a while because it does 
not adequately model the way individuals decide how 
much money to hold. 
We have already noted one way this is true: the 
equation does not include a measure of transaction 
costs, which the one-period theory behind the equation 
considers an important determinant of money demand. 
Redefining money was an attempt to get around that 
requirement, but as we have seen, it did not work. A 
closer look at the theory reveals why. 
When transaction costs change sharply, the demand 
for different definitions of money is not all that is 
affected. Individuals do decide to hold their wealth in 
different ways, but other decisions are affected too— 
especially how much they will spend in any period. 
Impulse buying is likely to increase, for example, when 
wealth kept in interest-bearing accounts becomes 
easier to spend: people can write "checks" on those 
accounts immediately instead of first making a trip to 
the bank. 
That changes in transaction costs change spending 
as well as the allocation of wealth among financial 
assets means, of course, that they also change the 
relationship between spending and money holdings, 
however money is defined. Thus, in an aggregate 
money demand equation, the coefficient of the spend-
ing variable will change with transaction costs; in an 
unstable financial environment, the equation will not 
be stable. Regardless of which assets are counted as 
money, then, unless transaction costs are actually in 
the equation to catch their own sharp changes, the 
equation can only be a very poor predictor of money 
demand. 
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This helps explain why the standard equation has 
been failing badly since the mid-1970s. Because of the 
difficulty of measuring transaction costs, the equation 
has not included them at a time when the introduction 
of new financial instruments has sharply changed those 
costs and spending and the demand for money. Further, 
this suggests that the standard equation won't be stable 
soon, for the financial industry seems likely to continue 
to change rapidly for some time. 
Computer-communications technology which lowers 
the costs of cashing in assets has begun to be adapted 
to this industry, most prominently in automatic tellers, 
cash machines, and electronic payroll depositing. 
Wider use of this kind of technology seems inevitable, 
and it will be encouraged by a new regulatory environ-
ment. The government has begun to loosen its restraints 
on the financial industry, allowing NOW accounts to 
be offered nationwide in 1981, for example, and begin-
ning to phase out interest rate ceilings on savings 
accounts. With more freedom to compete, firms will 
undoubtedly introduce cost-cutting technologies as 
well as new financial assets that fill gaps in the 
existing spectrum. That will surely affect the costs 
people face when they decide how to hold their wealth, 
the amount of spending they want to do, and ultimately 
their demand for money. An aggregate demand equa-
tion without explicit measures of transaction costs will 
thus still be unreliable. 
Even if transaction costs could be measured or 
should stabilize, though, the macro money demand 
equation would still fail as a policymaking predictor for 
the Federal Reserve. For as Lucas (1976) has demon-
strated, this type of equation is inadequate in a much 
more fundamental way: the theory behind it—and so 
the equation—does not acknowledge that individual 
decision making involves looking ahead. 
The theory behind the standard equation, remember, 
does not mention expectations of anything as an impor-
tant determinant of money demand in a given period. 
Yet individuals trying to do the best they can for 
themselves will not limit themselves to considering just 
their current situation. Rather, how much spending 
they will do in any period and how much money they 
will hold to finance that spending will depend crucially 
on what they expect such factors as income, prices, 
interest rates, and transaction costs to be in the future. 
Some researchers working with the standard equa-
tion appear to have recognized this inadequacy in the 
theory and, since expectations are so hard to measure, 
have tried to make up for it by tacking on things like the 
lagged money stock and the ratchet interest rate vari-
able. But for predicting the effects of alternative mone-
tary policies the tack-on technique is not good enough 
because it misses the interrelationships between indi-
viduals' expectations, their spending and money holding 
decisions, and government policies. 
What people expect things like prices, rates, and 
costs to be in any future period depends critically on 
what government policies will be. If future policies are 
going to be the same as in the past, then people will use 
the historical relationships they have observed among 
economic variables to help predict these variables. If 
future policies are going to be different, however, then 
people will stop relying on historical relationships to 
help them make predictions, or at least they will use 
history differently. 
Consider, for example, what would happen if the 
Federal Reserve announced a new, very simple policy 
of aiming to fix the federal funds rate at 1 percent. This 
obviously would be quite a change from past policies 
and would make past economic relationships obsolete 
as forecasters. People trying to do the best they can 
for themselves would recognize that and devise some 
better way to form expectations of anything related to 
the funds rate, particularly prices and interest rates on 
nonmoney assets. 
Changes in expectations such as these bring changes 
in people's decisions about how much spending to do 
and how to allocate their wealth. So, as government 
policies change, the relationships between money de-
mand and its determinants will change as well; these 
historical relationships will be obsolete too.
6 
This means, of course, that the coefficients repre-
senting those relationships in an aggregate money 
demand equation will keep changing with government 
policies. For the purposes of policy evaluation, in other 
words, the search for a stable money demand equation 
is futile. 
Conclusion 
As a predictor of money demand under current gov-
ernment policies, the aggregate equation need not be 
discarded. Someday it may be reliable—if the financial 
6For a technical elaboration of this argument, see the article by Thomas J. 
Sargent in this Quarterly Review and Lucas and Sargent 1979. 
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industry and transaction costs settle down or if some-
one devises a way to adequately measure and represent 
transaction costs. Until then anyone using an aggregate 
equation to forecast under current policies must recog-
nize that their errors will continue to be large and 
perhaps will be even larger than in the past. 
If the Fed and other policymakers want models to 
help them choose the best economic policies, though, 
the Lucas critique suggests that they should abandon 
the current macroeconomic approach. Since changes 
in government policies have such far-reaching effects 
on individual decision making, policymakers should 
turn to models which explicitly take this into account.
7 
7For a technical description of such models, see the article by Thomas J. 
Sargent in this Quarterly Review. 
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